The Origins of the Aghlabids by Kennedy, Hugh
 1 
This is the version of the chapter accepted for publication in The aghlabids and their Neighbors 
published by Brill 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/29944  
 
Hugh Kennedy SOAS University of London 
The Origins of the Aghlabids. 
 This paper has a simple objective, to investigate how the Aghlabids, a 
comparatively obscure family of Arab descent but based in North East Iran at the time 
of the Abbasid Revolution of 747-50 came to be the first independent Muslim rulers 
of Ifriqiya.1 In order to do this, we have to look back at the history of the Muslim 
occupation of the area. We will consider the evolution of independence and what it 
meant and how the Aghlabid family were able to assert their authority over the 
process and became, by the death of the third amir Ziyādat Allah in 223/838, the 
effective rulers of a self-governing Muslim polity. 
 The history of Ifriqiya between the  Abbasid Revolution of 750 and the 
emergence of the Aghlabid emirate is a confusing and in many ways, unedifying 
story.2 Warfare against the Khariji rebels and constant insurrections of the jund who 
                                                        
1 Ifrīqiya, derived, of course from the Latin Africa, is the name given by the Arabic sources to the lands 
of modern Tunisia, western Libya, including Tripoli, and parts of eastern Algeria. 
2 The main Arabic narrative source for Ifriqiya in the early Abbasid period is  Ibn Idhārī al-Marrākushi 
(d. after 712/1310) Kitāb bayāb al-mughrib ed. G. S. Colin and E. Levi-Provencal, which gives us a 
bare chronological narrative. Throuout this paper, I have relied on Ibn Idhārī’s careful chronology for 
the dates of appointments and dismissal of governors and other important evevnts The history of 
Ifriqiya is covered in vol.1 (Leiden, Brill, 1948). Also of use is the Ḥullat al-siyarā’ of Ibn al-Abbār (d. 
658/1260) which gives us short biographies of notable  
fi fgures in the history of the province ed. Hussain Mones (Cairo, 1963). Although compiled many 
centuries after the events, both works preserve material from much earlier works. The great annalist of 
the eastern Islamic world, Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭabarī, Ta’rīkh al-rusul wa’l-mulūk ed. M. J. de Goeje et al. (3 
series, Leiden, Brill, 1879-1901) really only mentions Ifriqiya when figures from the ʿAbbasid court, 
like Harthama b. Ayan are involved. On the other hand, Aḥmad b. Yahya al-Balādhuri gives a short but 
very interesting account of the rise of the Aghlabids which has the merit of being composed within a 
century of the events (al-Balādhuri, Futūḥ al-Buldān ed M. J. de Goeje (Leiden, Brill, 1866), 233-4 at a 
time when the ghlabids wee still ruling Ifriqiya. 
The secondary sources for this period of the history of Ifriqiya are very meager. The main account, 
Talbi, Mohamed, L’Emirat Aghlabide: histoire politique. (Paris, 1966) is dated but basically reliable. 
See also Brett, M. and Fentress, E., The Berbers  (Oxford, Blackwell, 1996). For the most recent 
account with full bibliography, E. Manzano, “The Iberian Peninsula and North Africa” in New 
Cambridge History of Islam (Cambridge, 2010) I, 581-622   
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were supposed to uphold Abbasid rule in the province dominate the sparse historical 
narratives on which we depend for understanding the course of these complex events. 
The problems of governing the province were intractable and in many ways it is 
surprising, not that the caliphs abandoned it but rather that they held on to it for so 
long. The first of these problems was the continuing resistance of the native Berber 
populations to Arab and Caliphal rule. This took the form of repeated Khariji 
rebellions, normally confined to the mountainous and desert margins of the province 
but sometimes penetrating to the centre of the province in the fertile lands around 
Qayrawan and Tunis. The Abbasids, notably the caliph al-Manṣūr, committed a huge 
amount in both men and money to maintain caliphal rule. The second major problem 
was that the jund  who were sent from the East to contain the threat from the Berbers, 
needed to be paid on a regular basis and the resources of the province simply could 
not provide for the salaries of this large military establishment. This could only be 
done with financial subsidy from Egypt which could not always be guaranteed. The 
governors appointed by the caliphs were in an extremely difficult position. They were 
caught between the need to defend the province against the Kharijis, the even more 
pressing need to pay the jund and the increasing reluctance of the Baghdad 
government to provide the necessary financial support. Only a governor like Yazīd b. 
Ḥātim al-Muhallabi , with his resources of commercial and kinship links, could 
square the circle for a while. In the end the Aghlabids were able to establish and 
maintain their independent power because they were themselves scions of the jund 
but also because the caliphs in Baghdad and Samarra, and their governors in Egypt, 
apparently abandoned the province after the death of the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd in 
809. Even then Aghlabid rule was challenged by the disaffected jund  and the  
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Aghlabids were only saved by the opening of the conquest of Sicily and the additional 
resources and opportunities that provided.    
 The origins of the Aghlabids were fairly obscure. The unusual name Aghlab 
seems to mean thick-necked in the sense of proud or strong. It is also one of the many 
Arabic words for lion, lions having thick necks. They claimed to be descendants of 
the great tribe of Tamīm of north-eastern Arabia and had probably settled in the Iraqi 
garrison cities, either Kufa or Basra, after the first Arab conquests. From there they 
moved on to the expanding frontier in Khurasan and are said to have established 
themselves at the small town of Marv al-Rud, now on the north western frontier of 
Afghanistan. Again like many families of similar origin, they joined the armies of the 
Abbasid revolution but they were not among the highest ranking quwwād (army 
commanders) and we hear nothing of them during the campaigns which brought the 
dynasty to power. Al-Aghlab was probably recruited into the guard of the caliph al-
Manṣūr. According to Maghribi sources 3, he was one of the men who murdered Abū 
Muslim on the caliph’s orders but al-Ṭabarī and the other eastern sources know 
nothing of this. It was natural that a man of his origins and status would join the jund 
recruited by Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath to establish Abbasid rule over Ifriqiya. 
 The initial Muslim conquest had begun in 642 but proceeded sporadically until 
the final conquest of Carthage from the Byzantines in 698-9.4 The defeat of the 
Byzantines, however, did not bring peace. Far from it: the plains of Tunisia, always 
the most densely settled and urbanised parts of the Maghreb, were bordered on the 
West and South by more arid and mountainous areas. Many of the  people of these 
lands were Berbers living nomad or transhumant lives and grouped in a number of 
                                                        
3 Ibn al-Abbār, Ḥulla, 68-9 
4 On this see W. Kaegi, Muslim Expansion and Byzantine Collapse in North Africa (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2010) and H. Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests (London, Wedenfeld 
and Nicolson, 2007), 200-224 
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tribes. They were determined to maintain their independence, a determination which 
must have been made all the fiercer by the fact that the Muslim presence was 
characterised by large scale slave raiding. The Arabic sources are clear and 
unapologetic about this: it was all part of God’s bounty to the Muslims. Berber 
women were especially highly sought after by elite families in the Islamic Middle 
East. It is worth remembering that both the mother of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muʿāwiya, 
first Umayyad ruler of al-Andalus (756-788) and the second ʿAbbasid caliph al-
Manṣūr (754-775) were Berbers. In the case of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān there can be little 
doubt that this maternal connection was one of the reasons why he chose to flee to the 
West and secured protection when most of the rest of his family were destroyed by 
the victorious Abbasids. Al-Manṣūr may well have maintained contacts with groups 
in his mother’s homeland and he is said to have been knowledgeable about Ifrīqīya  
and only sent members of his elite (khāssa) as governors of the province.5 It may be 
that this this was one of the reasons why he was prepared to invest considerable 
military resources in to assert Abbasid control over the area in defiance of military 
and, especially, financial logic. 
 Berber resistance to Arab rule continued throughout the Umayyad period, with 
major revolts in 697-8, led by the famous and mysterious Kāhina, and 740-1. This 
second rebellion almost resulted in the complete destruction of Arab rule, despite the 
despatch of a very large Syrian army by the Umayyad Caliph Hishām .  
 The period from 735 onwards saw another element in this complex scene. The 
Kharijite sect had emerged in the decades which followed the first Muslim conquests 
in Iraq and Iran as protest movement of Arab Muslims against the domination of the 
state by a privileged elite and against enforced sedentarisation and the payment of 
                                                        
5 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 78 
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taxes. The movements were strongest at first in southern Iran and the environment of 
the great port city of Basra in southern Iraq. The most militant group, the Azāriqa, 
were effectively destroyed by Umayyad forces led by al-Muhallab b. Abī Sufra al-
Azdi (d.702) but other groups, notably the Sufriya and the Ibadiya survived by 
dispersing and finding support in outlying and marginal areas, like Uman, where the 
Ibadiya are still an important element in the population, and some of the Berber areas 
of North Africa. With their rejection of the Quraysh elite and their resistance to 
compulsory taxation and tribute. Khariji ideology appealed to many of the Berbers 
who adopted it as a separate and distinctive Muslim identity. Despite the origins of 
Kharijism in the thoroughly Arab milieu of early Islamic Basra, the sources make it 
clear that the vast majority of the adherents of the sect in the Maghreb were Berbers, 
living in tribal groups on the mountain areas which surrounded the plains of Tunisia. 
They were to be the most formidable of the enemies of caliphal power in the area but 
we know little about their society or organization. The Arabic sources only give us the 
names of tribes or leaders of major revolts. They are the other, with almost no 
individual identities or speaking parts in the narratives.  
 At the time of the Abbasid revolution of 132/750 the settled areas of central 
Ifriqiya were under the authority of  a semi-independent governor, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. 
Ḥabīb al-Fihrī, scion of a Qurashi family and a direct descendant of ʿUqba b. Nāfiʿ 
who had played such an important role in the initial Muslim conquests of the 
Maghreb. He was assassinated by his son in 755 and in the ensuing mayhem the 
Khariji Berbers took advantage of the situation. In 758 the Ibadi tribes of Nafusa and 
Hawwara from the lands south of Tripoli, under the leadership of their Imam Abū’l-
Khaṭṭāb, took Qayrawan itself. While Abū’l-Khṭṭāb remained in Tripoli, Qayrawan 
was ruled by an associate of his, a man of Iranian origin, called ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. 
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Rustam. It seemed as if the Arab conquest was completely reversed and that the 
Maghreb would be ruled by Berber speaking Ibadis, separate from and fundamentally 
antagonistic to, the eastern Caliphate. 
 At this critical juncture, however, al-Manṣūr decided to take firm military 
action. According to one source, the initiative for this action came from a group of the 
“Arabs of Ifriqiya”, presumably descendants of those soldiers who had come to the 
province in Umayyad times, sent a delegation to the Caliph to request his support 
against the Berbers.6 He responded by sending a vast jund, an army of some 40,000 
men7 led by twenty eight quwwād,8 under the command of Muhammad b. al-Ashʿath 
al-Khuzāʿī. Ibn al-Ashʿath, like many of the leaders of the Abbasid military, was of 
Arab descent but his family had settled in Khurasan, the north-eastern province of 
Iran. His troops too were largely drawn from Khurasan and it was natural  that Aghlab 
b. Sālim al-Tamīmī should join them as one of the quwwād. Abū’l-Khaṭṭāb and his 
Khariji followers were defeated and Ibn al-Ashʿath was established as governor in 
Qayrawan, which was fortified for the first time and which, along with the new 
coastal town of Tunis, formed  the core of the province. Ibn al-Aghlab was sent to 
remote Tubna in the Zab where he could keep an eye on the Berbers of the Aures 
mountains and the desert frontier.  
 This expedition represented an enormous commitment of men and resources. 
The total number of salaried soldiers in the Abbasid army was probably no more than 
150,000 at the most and many of these were tied up in local garrison duties.  When al-
Manṣūr, was faced with the major rebellion of the Alid Muḥammad “the Pure Soul” 
in Medina and his brother Ibrāhīm in Basra in 762, he had only a thousand men with 
                                                        
6 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 72 
7 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 72. Bal.232 says 70,000 or 40,000 
8 quwwād (sing. qā’id) was the name given to military commanders in the Abbasid army who led, and 
in many cases, recruited the soldiers. See H. Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs 
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him in his newly founded capital of Baghdad. Another 30,000 were with his son 
Muḥammad al-Mahdī in Rayy in Central Iran but the largest force in the Abbasid 
army were the 40,000 sent with Ibn al-Ashʿath in Tunisia.9  
These troops and their descendants, known collectively as the jund  were to be 
the dominant military force in Ifriqiya for the next century and determined much of 
the political life of the province. At one level, they were fairly successful. They did 
protect Qayrawan and the plains more or less effectively, from the Khariji Berbers but 
at a price. The Abbasid army was a professional force. They were paid salaries (ʿaṭā) 
by the state in coined money every month. The actual amount of these salaries is not 
exactly clear but sources suggest that 60 dirham or 720 a year.10 If 40,000 men were 
receiving this sort of pay, the maintenance of the jund would amount to 28,800,000 
dirham per year. This was at a time when the tax yield of Egypt, the  most valuable 
province of the Caliphate after Iraq was 1,920,000 gold dinar, equivalent to 
42,240,000 dirham. The same source says that the revenues of Ifriqiya amounted to 
just 13,000,000 dirham and “one hundred at twenty carpets”.11  The jund of Ifriqiya, 
like the other units, were garrisoned in the major towns, Qayrawan and Tunis and 
smaller towns like Mila and Al-Urbus in the Jebel and Tubna in the Zab. They seem 
to have been city based and they were not dispersed in the countryside. They did not 
become landowners or famers or herdsmen. They were totally dependent on the ʿaṭā 
for their livelihoods and would take violent action if necessary to ensure that they 
were paid. 
                                                        
9 al-Ṭabarī, Ta’rīkh, III, 304-5: H. Kennedy, The Early Abbasid Caliphate, 77 for a discussion of the 
total numbers. 
10 H. Kennedy, “Military pay and the economy of the early Islamic state” Historical Research, 75 
(2002), 157-169 
11 The figures are taken from the account of the revenues of the Caliphate during the reign of al-Rashīd 
(786-809) given in al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-wuzarā ed. M. El-Sakka et al. (Cairo, 1938), 281-8. 
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 It was normally accepted in Abbasid fiscal practice that the expenses of the 
local military would be paid from the revenues of the province in which they were 
stationed and that the surplus would be sent to the capital in Baghdad. However, as 
we have seen, the military establishment in Ifrīqiya was very large, vastly greater that 
could be maintained in the resources generated by local tax revenues. There is some 
indication that revenues from Egypt were sent to Qayrawan to try to meet the deficit 
but this was often problematic, especially when the financial administration of the 
caliphate was controlled by administrators like the famous Barmakid family  who 
were intent on ensuring that the centre received its share.12 
 The jund of Ifriqiya were not a homogenous force. They came in two major 
waves, with Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath and later, in 771, with Yazīd b. Ḥātim al-
Muhallabi who is said to have arrived with 60,000 more men which no doubt helped 
to keep the Berbers at bay but certainly increased the fiscal burden. They came from 
different regional armies in the east. The majority were almost certainly Khurasanis 
but there were also substantial numbers of Syrians as well. We hear of troops from the 
junds  (in this context, the districts into which Syria was divided for administrative 
purposes) of Damascus  and Hims settled in particular areas, the jund of Damascus in 
al-Urbus and that of Hims in Mīla, a process we can also observe  in the early 
settlement of Muslim forces in al-Andalus where different units settled in their own 
areas. The leaders of the jund in the eighth and the beginning of the ninth century 
almost all bear Arab names and tribal nisbas, though many of them must have been of 
Iranian descent. Forces of the jund were settled in Qayrawan and Tunis, where an 
arsenal, Dār al-ṣināʿa was established by the end of the century. There were also 
                                                        
12 See al-Balādhuri, Futūḥ, 234 who narrates that Ibrahim b. al-Aghlab, at the beginning of his rule was 
only saved from the wrath of the jund, who demanded their arzāq when money was brought to him 
from the revenues of Egypt. 
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units in Tripoli, Tubna, the capital of the Zab region, in Mila, where the jund led by 
Mālik b. al-Mundhir al-Kalbī were stationed in 179/79513 and al-Urbus. Rivalries 
between the jund settled in Qayrawan and Tunis were yet another source of division. 
All the smaller centres of the jund, Tobna, al-Urbus (Laribus) and Mila (Milev) had 
been Byzantine garrison towns and were still protected by their Byzantine walls. 
 This stressful economic position was the cause of many of the upheavals and 
problems which faced the Abbasid governors and which, ultimately, gave the 
Aghlabid family their opportunity. 
 At the time of the first Abbasid expedition to Ifriqiya, things in the province 
were very dismal for the Arab Muslim settlers in Qayrawan and the surrounding 
areas. In 140/757-8, the city had been taken and burned by the Sufriya Kharijis who 
were in turn, driven out by the Ibadis under their formidable leader Abū ‘l-Khaṭṭāb.  
As we have seen, in 761 the Abbasid army led by Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath arrived 
and recovered Qayrawan where Muhammad was installed as governor, while al-
Aghlab b. Sālim, who had come with him, took over the remote but strategically 
important town of Tubna. Successive Berber armies were defeated and forced to 
retreat to their mountainous homelands and the head of Abū’l-Khaṭtāb was sent in 
triumph to Baghdad. The new governor set about building walls for Qayrawan, at 
exactly the same time, Ibn Idhari notes, that al-Manṣūr was building the walls of 
Baghdad and “he took a firm grip (ḍabaṭa) on Ifriqiya and its districts (aʿmāl)”.14 He 
defeated the Ibadis of Zuwayla and in 762, surprisingly, “he calmed the situation of 
Ifriqiya and there was no movement (ḥaraka) against him”. 
                                                        
13 Ibn al-Abbar, Ḥulla, 84 
14 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 72 
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 The apparent peace did not last for long. By 765 relations between the jund 
and their commander Ibn al-Ashʿath had broken down completely and he was driven 
out, without bloodshed,15 by a military mutiny led by one of his quwwād, ʿĪsā b. Mūsā 
b. ʿAjlān. He was supported by “some of the Arabs16 and the jund” but he had no 
appointment (ʿahd) from the caliph and no consent (tarādin) from the general 
populace (ʿāmmah). 17 This mutiny was the first of many in which the jund confronted 
the governors. We are rarely told the reasons fort their apparently contrary attitudes 
but they were almost certainly financial.  
 The debacle of this first period of Aghlabid rule was followed by a long period 
of domination by the Muhallabi family (771-793), one of whose members Yazīd b. 
Ḥātim, provided the longest period of tranquillity in the history of Ifriqiya in the 
eighth century. To understand why this should be so, certain features of the history of 
this remarkable family should be noted. The Muhallabis came from the tribe of Azd 
who were mostly located in pre-Islamic times in Uman at the south east of the 
Arabian peninsula. In the aftermath of the first Muslim conquests, they established 
themselves in Basra where Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra distinguished him self by leading 
the armies of Basra against the Kharijites, notably the fierce and blood-thirsty 
Azraqites.  The Basra connection was important in two distinct ways. Firstly, Basra 
was the centre of the development of Kharijism in the early Umayyad period. Despite 
al-Muhallab’s campaigns against the extremist Azraqites, relations between the 
Muhallabis and other Kharijite groups like the Sufriya and the Ibadiya were peaceful, 
even friendly.18 ʿĀtika, sister of the second great leader of the family, Yazīd b. al-
                                                        
15 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 73, says “they asked him to leave”.  
16 Though it is not entirely clear, this probably refers to Arabs who had settled in the province before 
the arrival of the jund. 
17 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 73 
18 For these connections see T. Lewicki, “al-Ibāḍiyya” in EI 2 sv. 
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Muhallab, was a fervent supporter of the Ibadiya in Basra. Although it is never 
explicitly stated in the texts, the fact that the Sufriya and Ibadiya, who had been so 
militantly hostile to Arab and Abbasid rule before hardly caused any disturbances 
during the governorate of Yazīd b. Ḥātim, must surely be connected with the good 
relations which had been established in Basra. 
 The second, and connected, factor was, of course, that Basra was a great 
trading centre and the Kharijis, especially the Ibadis developed strong trading 
networks. These networks stretched from Basra west into the Maghreb but also east to 
Sind, which has been conquered, at least to some extent from 712 onwards. Again, the 
texts do not spell it out but the fact that the Muhallabis had interests in Sind and, for 
example the fact that the first Muhallabi governor, ʿAmr b. Ḥafṣ, transferred directly 
from the governorate of Sind to that of Ifriqiya, from Multan to Qayrawan, illustrates 
the breadth of Muhallabi interests and their coincidence with the interests of Ibadi 
merchants. It was Yazīd b. Ḥātim who “organized the suqs of Qayrawan and put each 
trade in its place”19 and it seems likely that part of the arrangement between the 
Kharijites and the Muhallabis was that the former should have access to these new 
markets. As Dr Johnson observed, “men are seldom so innocently employed as when 
they are making money” and the long years of peace may have been a result of this 
planning. 
 Muhallabi rule was established by Yazīd b. Ḥātim. Described as a member of  
the caliph al-Manṣūr’s inner circle (khāṣṣ) he had already served as governor 
Armenia, Sind, Azerbayan and Egypt. Like his famous grandfather, Muhallab b. Abī 
Ṣufra, he was well known for his for his generosity and, determination and 
perspicacity, duly celebrated by the poets of the time, even those who had never met 
                                                        
19 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 78 
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him or seen him.20 He also benefitted from the support of his numerous family (al-
Muhallab is said to have had over three hundred children, male and female) many of 
whom served him in subordinate positions. Nonetheless Muhallabi rule was 
established by a mighty influx of military power. Yazīd b. Ḥātim brought with him an 
army said to have numbered 60,000 men from Syria, Iraq and Khurasan. Al-Ṭabari 
says that al-Manṣūr spent the vast sum of 63,000,000 dirham on the army.21 They first 
stopped in Tripoli where Abū Ḥātim the Kharijite leader was defeated and killed. The 
army then moved on to Qayrawan and Yazīd established himself  in 772.22 The next 
year he sent a relative of his, al-ʿAlā b. Saʿīd al- Muhallabi to take over Tubna and the 
Zab.23 
 He also consolidated his rule in the capital. In 774-5 he renewed the building 
(jaddada binā’) of the great mosque in Qayrawan. It is also in this period that we can 
see the growing influence of the proto-Maliki judges of Qayrawan. When the qadi 
ʿAbd Allah b. Ziyād died in 778-9, apparently after eating a dish of fish and yoghurt 
at the governor’s table, there was a huge crowd at his funeral and Yazīd himself led 
the mourners. 
 Yazīd died in Ramadan 171/February 788 having remained in power from the 
caliphate of al-Manṣūr, through the reigns of al-Mahdi and al-Hadi into the beginning 
of the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd.24 It was a hard act to follow. As soon as he was dead, 
another rebellion was raised by the Ibadis in the Jabal Baja which was only put down 
with difficulty. Nonetheless Muhallabi rule survived in the person of his elder brother, 
Rawḥ b. Ḥātim, described as a dozy and senile old man.25 
                                                        
20 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 81 
21 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 78-82 
22 al-Ṭabarī, Ta’rīkh, III, 373 
23 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 79 
24 al-Ṭabarī, III, Ta’rīkh, 569 
25 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 84-5 
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An interesting illustration of the powerful connections which still existed 
between the Abbasid authorities in Iraq and Ifriqiya can be seen in the story of the 
appointment of Naṣr b. Ḥabīb al-Muhallabi as governor in 791. When it was apparent 
that Rawḥ b. Ḥātim was declining, Naṣr b. Ḥabiīb and the  qa’id Abū’l-ʿAnbar  wrote 
to al-Rashid saying how worried they were “because Ifriqiya is a large frontier zone 
(thughr kabīr) which would not be safe without a strong ruler (bi gahyri sulṭān)”.26 
Nasr had been ṣāḥib al-shurṭa to Yazīd b. Ḥātim in Egypt and Ifriqiya so al-Rashīd 
wrote to him secretly appointing him as governor. When Rawḥ eventually died, the 
oath of allegiance was taken to his son Qabīsa by the people gathered in the mosque 
of Qayrawan.  Meanwhile Abū’-ʿAnbar and the ṣāḥib al-barīd went to Naṣr with al-
Rashīd’s ʿahd  (document of appointment) and they rode with him to the mosque 
where they found Qabīsa sitting on the farāsh (cushion). They made him get up and 
Naṣr to sit in his place and told the people (al-nās) what the position was. They read 
out Rashīd’s letter and the people “heard and obeyed” and accepted their new ruler.  
 Muhallabid rule was brought to an end by the jund. In 793 for reasons which 
are not explained, al-Rashid wrote to depose Naṣr and appoint another Muhallabi, 
Faḍl b. Rawḥ who was then governor of the Zab. Installed in Qayrawan, he then 
appointed his nephew al-Mughīra as governor in Tunis. He was a man without 
experience or political awareness (siyāsa) 27and he aroused the anger of the jund who, 
under the leadership of one Abū’l-Jarud besieged him in the dār al-imāra 
(government house) of the city and eventually drove him out to Qayrawan. There was 
a long standoff which resulted in the death of the governor Rawḥ at the hands of the 
                                                        
26 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 85 
27 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 86 
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jund. The upshot was that Abū’l-Jarud, now effectively in control wrote to the caliph 
al-Rashīd who pardoned him and appointed him as governor.28 
 The dawla29 of the Muhallabis in Ifriqiya had come to an end after twenty 
three years. As Talbi points out, although authority passed from one family member 
to another, the succession was controlled by the caliphal administration. Son was 
never allowed to succeed father, as Qabīsa had found out when he was humiliated in 
the mosque at Qayrawan. On the other hand, the caliphal government could not 
control Ifriqiya without an individual or family who could attract the respect of the 
jund and knew how to manage them. 
For the next decade or so, the Baghdad government tried, unsuccessfully to 
find a replacement for the Muhallabis.  Now the caliph was granting not just a pardon 
but the office of governor to a man, Abu’l-Jarud who had just been responsible for the 
death of the man, Rawh, whom he had just appointed.  
 The next few years saw the caliphal government trying various strategies to 
solve the problem of governing Ifriqiya. The first was the appointment of a man from 
the heart of the caliphal administration to take charge. Harthama b. Aʿyan, who 
arrived in the province in June 795,  was one of al-Rashīd’s most trusted advisers and 
operatives. As far as we know, he had no previous experience of the province and 
brought with him only a small (kathīf) army. He is said to have treated the people well 
and made overtures to the Berbers. He built the famous ribat at Munastir, probably to 
provide a base where he could defend himself against the unruly jund, 30 but “when he 
saw what he saw of the conflict in Ifriqiya, the disobedience of its people, he sought 
                                                        
28 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 86-8 
29 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 88 
30 Circumstances suggest that this is a more likely explanation for the founding of this building than 
defence from Byzantine raids. 
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to be excused and al-Rashīd wrote to him giving him permission to return to the East” 
and he left in October 797.31 
 Despite this rebuff, Harun and the Barmakids still seems to have believed that 
Ifriqiya could be governed like any other province. The centralising tendencies of 
Barmakid administration left little scope for accommodation with local interests; 
provincial elites were increasingly excluded from power in their provinces. After 
Harthama’s retirement, they appointed Muḥammad b. Muqātil al-ʿAkki. He comes 
across in the sources as a gilded youth from the heart of the caliphal court, but a man 
with neither experience nor judgment and, possibly, a man with little enthusiasm for 
the arduous work of governing troublesome provinces. “This Muḥammad” Ibn Idhari 
notes tartly, “was a man with no praiseworthy conduct”.32 His main claim to fame 
was that his father was one of the great men of the ʿAbbasid dawla he was a milk-
brother (raḍīʿ) of the caliph, a distinction he shared with Jaʿfar the Barmakid.33 He 
had, as far as we can tell no experience in or contacts with the province before his 
appointment. 
 He aroused popular hostility by having Bahlūl b. Rāṣhid, the  leading religious 
figure of the time, flogged and imprisoned so that he died. More dangerously, he 
reduced the wages (arzāq) of the jund, perhaps on the orders of his Barmakid masters, 
and oppressed the people. This united both the Khurasanis and the Syrians in the jund 
who rebelled under the leadership of Tammām b. Tamīm al-Tamīmī, the financial 
administrator (ʿāmil) of Tunis. The united jund defeated the governor’s army and 
besieged him in his house (he had apparently left the official residence,) the Dār al-
                                                        
31 For Harthama’s rule in Ifriqiya, al-Ṭabarī, Ta’rīkh, III, 142, 645 
32 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 88 
33 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 89. His relationship with al-Rashīd and the Barmakids is discussed at some 
length in Talbi, 82-5 
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Imāra. An aman was arranged, allowing Muḥammad to leave with his family and his 
property and establish himself in Tripoli.34 
 Tammām now became governor of Ifriqiyya but he was, as Ibn Idhari notes, a 
usurper  (mutaghallib), without any deed of appointment (ʿahd) from al-Rashīd.35 
Subsequent events were to show how important this was, despite the apparent 
weakness the caliphal government. It was this lack of legitimacy which gave Ibrāhīm 
b.al-Aghlab his chance. He was at this time governor of the Zab, as his father had 
been before him, and we must think that the area was something of a power base for 
the family. He rushed to Qayrawan and, while Tammām retired to Tunis, he went to 
the great mosque and ascended the minbar36 .  He was, we are told, a man of great 
eloquence and he used this to tell the assembled people that he had only come to 
support Muḥammad and assert the cause of Abbasid legitimacy. He wrote to 
Muḥammad explaining what he had done and inviting him to return. That this played 
well with at least some elements of the population is suggested by an anecdote which 
has in walking in one of the alleys and hearing a woman in one of the vaulted 
passages (ṭāq) shouting at him “I give thanks for he has restored to you the role 
(mulk) of Ifriqiya”.37 
 There then followed a period of three point negotiations, with Tammām, from 
his base in Tunis, trying to convince Muḥammad that Ibrāhīm was only seeking his 
destruction. Ibn Muqātil, however, found Ibn al-Aghlab a more convincing ally and 
stuck with him. So Tammām led a great army (ʿaskar ʿadhīm) from Tunis against 
Qayrawan. When this was defeated, Ibn al-Aghlab led a counter-attack on Tunis and 
                                                        
34 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 90 
35 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 90 
36 It is interesting to note that possession of the great mosque was a sign of control, much more than 
possession of the Dār al-Imāra. 
37 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 90 
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forced Tammām to seek an aman which was duly granted. If the tangled events of this 
period tell us anything about the structures of power it is that caliphal legitimacy was 
a powerful factor.  Tammām’s status as a usurper  without an ʿahd played a major part 
in his defeat. Ibn al-Aghlab came to power, not as a separatist rebels trying to set up 
an independent regime for himself but as, at least in public discourse, a loyal servant 
of the Abbasid dawla intent on restoring legitimate government. 
 It was against this background that the caliph sent a letter dismissing Ibn al-
Akkī as governor and sending Ibrahim an ʿahd as governor of Ifriqiyya. According to 
al-Balādhurī, our earliest source, al-Rashid asked Harthama, by now returned to the 
east, who he would recommend to replace al-ʿAkkī and it was he who recommended 
Ibrahim.38 The letter of appointment arrived in the middle of Jumada II, 184/June, 800 
and this can be said to mark the beginning of Aghlabid rule in the province but not of 
the independence of Ifrīqiyya from Abbasid rule. The sources wax lyrical about 
Ibrahim’s talents as warrior, orator and judge, not surprising given that fact that the 
chronicles on which our sources depend were largely compiled during the rule of his 
descendants. He seems to have been largely accepted by the jund and was on good 
terms with the Berbers. He also began consolidating his authority by building a new 
palace enclosure, later known as the Qaṣr al-qadīm about three miles from Qayrawan. 
He moved the Dār al-Imāra there and secretly moved his arms and military supplies 
there and settled his slaves and the people he trusted around it.39  
 Al-Baladhuri gives a slightly more extended description: “Ibrahim built the 
White Palace (qaṣr al-abyaḍ) two miles south of Qayrawan, gave the people plots of 
land around it and made it a miṣr and built a Friday Mosque with plaster and baked 
                                                        
38 al-Balādhuri, Futūḥ 232 
39 Ibn Idhari, Bayān, I, 92-3 
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brick and furnished it marble columns and a cedar roof, making it two hundred cubits 
square. He bought slaves and freed them, 5,000 in number and settled them around it. 
He called the city Abbasiya and it is still populated and flourishing to this day”. 40 
 But Ibrahim was no more immune from disturbances caused by the jund than 
his predecessors had been. He faced two major revolts, those of Ḥamdīs b. ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān al-Kindī in 186/802 and ʿImrān b. al-Muqallad in 194/809. In both cases he 
was able to defend himself from his new base in the Qasr with the help of his slave 
soldiers (ʿabīd never ghilmān or mamālīk in the sources). It would be interesting to 
know more about these but we have no indication about their origins or their skills 
and training. It is interesting that he was doing this a decade before the young 
Abbasid prince, Abū Isḥāq b. Hārūn al-Rashīd, later the caliph al-Muʿtaṣim began 
recruiting the slave soldiers in Baghdad, a small private army which enabled him the 
seize power after the death of his brother al-Ma’mūn in 833. 
When Ibrāhīm died in Shawwāl 196/July 812 he was succeeded by his son ʿAbd 
Allāh. His short and unhappy reign ended with his death from natural causes in Dhū’l-
Hijja197/June 817 and he was succeeded by his younger brother Ziyādat Allah who 
was in many ways the second founder of the Aghlabid regime.  
Before discussing his rule, however, it is interesting to look at the mechanism 
of succession in the family. Neither ʿAbd Allah nor Ziyādat Allah seem to have had 
the ʿahd of the caliph which had proved so crucial to the success of Ibrahim in seizing 
and retaining power. The reason for this was the crisis in the caliphate which 
essentially paralysed the caliphal administration. After the death of al-Rashīd there 
was a growing hostility between his two sons and heirs, al-Amīn and al-Ma’mūn 
which irrupted in open hostility in 195/810-11. In fact the successions occurred 
                                                        
40 al-Balādhuri, Futūḥ 234 
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exactly at the time when the political and military leaders in Baghdad and Fustat 
(Egypt) were entirely preoccupied by the huge conflict between the brothers. Even if 
they had wished, they were in no position to assert caliphal influence over the 
succession as al-Manṣūr and his successors had over the Muhallabi succession half a 
century before. 
At the time of Ibrāhīm’s death, the Aghlabid family were still very much part 
of the elite of the Abbasid caliphate. When in 196/812 the caliph al-Amīn retreated to 
the Round City in Baghdad in his final resistance to the attacks of his brother’s 
general Ṭāhir he had among his few remaining supporters Ibrāhīm’s son Muḥammad, 
called in al-Ṭabari’s account, al-Ifrīqī.41 While the desperate caliph hesitated about 
what to do, Muḥammad made a radical suggestion; “Your position and ours have 
come to what you see. We (Muḥammad was acting in concert with a local Baghdad 
commander) have formed a plan which we submit to you. Consider it and make up 
your mind, for we hope it will be right, and that God will make it prosper, if He will” 
“What is it?” he asked. “The men have scattered from you and the foe has encircled 
you on every side. Of your cavalry, 1.000 horses, the best and swiftest of them, 
remain with you. We think you should choose 700 of the abnā 42, men whom we 
know to love you. We will mount them on these horses and make a sortie by night 
from one of the gates (of the Round City) for ’the night belongs to its people’ and no 
one will stand firm against us, God willing. We will go out until we reach al-Jazira 
and Syria. You will raise troops and gather taxes and will you will be a large kingdom 
(mamlaka)  and a new domain (mulk). People will rally to you and the (enemy) 
soldiers will be prevented from pursuing you”. After initially agreeing, al-Amin 
                                                        
41 al-Ṭabarī, Ta’rīkh, III, 911-2. He must also be the al-Ifrīqī mentioned on p. 954 
42 lit. “sons”, the name given to the descendants of those Khurasani troops who put the Abbasids in 
power in 750 and who had settled in Baghdad 
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rejected this advice because other courtiers were threatened by Ṭāhir with the loss of 
all their property if the plan went ahead. Muḥammad, of course, was immune from 
such pressure as his estates lay far to the west in Ifriqiya, well out of the range of 
Ṭāhir and his men. The failure of this initiative meant the final end of the Aghlabid 
family’s presence at the court of the Caliphs and from this time, their activities were 
confined the the Maghreb. 
Whether the words quoted were actually spoken or not is, of course, 
impossible to say but it certainly reflects one of the options open to the cornered 
caliph, but more importantly from our point of view, it shows how the Aghlabids 
were still very much part of the caliph’s inner circle in Baghdad and closely linked the 
abnā from whom the Aghlabids themselves had sprung. 
The reign of Ziyadat Allah saw the last, and possibly, the greatest 
confrontation between the Aghlabids and the jund. The revolt of the jund was led by 
one Manṣūr b. Naṣr al-Tunbudhi  who took his nisba, not from the Arab tribe from 
which he could claim descent, but from the fortress near Tunis which he owned and 
from which he could dominate the route from Tunis to Qayrawan. As before, the 
proximate cause of the trouble was financial. Ziyādat Allah is said to have been very 
hard on the jund, probably because he could not afford to be generous, and, in the new 
political circumstances, there was no possibility of financial aid from Egypt which 
had saved amirs on previous occasions. The revolt began in 209/824 and the rebels 
soon controlled most of the country apart from Qabes in the south but Ziyādat Allah 
allied with the Berbers to regain the advantage and Manṣūr was captured and 
executed. 
 After the defeat of this revolt, the country seems to have become more 
peaceful and the basic structures of Ifriqiyan politics changed for good.. Two factors 
 21 
were important in this change. The first was that the Khariji Berbers had become less 
threatening and so the jund was not so essential to the survival of Aghlabid Ifriqiya. 
The fact that the Kutama of the Aures region were now being converted by Shi’ite 
missionaries did not seem, at this time a real threat. The second was the beginning of 
the conquest of Sicily. It is no coincidence that Ziyādatallah set this in motion in 
211/827, immediately after the defeat of Manṣūr’s rebellion. This meant not only was 
there a new outlet for the martial energies of the jund but, more importantly, there 
were new sources of revenue which could help to solve the cash-flow problems which 
had plagued Ifriqiyya since the first arrival of the jund with Ibn al-Ashʿath. 
 It is perhaps interesting to consider the reasons why the Aghlabids established 
an independent dynasty. Since the nineteenth century, if not before, we have come to 
consider the striving for “national” independence as a natural human aspiration. 
Empires are intrinsically evil and all good men and true follow the example of the 
rebels of 1848 in their demands for states of their own. Yet this is not the only model 
for the disintegration of empires. If we want to understand the Aghlabid process in a 
comparative historical perspective, we might be better to look at the collapse of the 
Soviet empire in Central Asia in the early 1990s. In both cases the new rulers were an 
integral part of the old imperial system and owed their status and advancement to its 
structures. Ibrāhīm, as we have seen, attained power as a supporter of Abbasid 
legitimacy against the usurper Tammām b. Tamīm. In both cases, however, the 
Empire collapsed from the centre, leaving such provincial potentates high and dry. 
The Caliphate, like the Gorbachev administration, could offer no structure of 
legitimacy. Neither the new caliph al-Ma’mūn or his successors seem to have made 
the slightest effort to restore their authority in Ifriqiya or reintegrate into the caliphate. 
They simply had to invent a new legitimacy of their own devising for no ʿahd would 
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arrive with the barīd to encourage their subjects to take the oath of allegiance. They 










    
